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Here is Danto’s gallery of indiscernibles
thought experiment (Danto, 1981, p.1)—a
thought experiment that radically trans-
formed the kind of questions aesthetics
and the philosophy of art asks today.
Imagine a gallery of indiscernible can-
vases that are all monochrome red of
the same shade and of the same size.
While the observable properties of all these
artworks are the same, their “meaning”
and aesthetic value can be very differ-
ent: if one of the paintings, made by
a counterrevolutionary Russian émigré is
called “Red Square” and the other one
is called “The Israelites crossing the Red
Sea,” then these two paintings, in spite
of being indistinguishable, will have very
different aesthetic value. Thus, aesthetic
value is only loosely (if at all) related to
perception.
Let us examine this argument more
closely. First, I need to introduce a bit of
terminology: I call a property “aestheti-
cally relevant” if attending to this property
changes one’s aesthetic evaluation (Nanay,
2015). Aesthetically relevant properties are
abundant. If I attend to the arrangement of
the small red patches in a Corot landscape,
it can change my experience and assess-
ment of the balance of the picture. And
if I attend to the second violin in a string
quartet, it can also change my experience
of the entire movement. Danto’s argument
is supposed to establish that there is only
a loose connection between aesthetically
relevant properties and perception.
Danto oscillates between two argu-
ments in his exposition of the gallery of
indiscernibles, one weaker and unprob-
lematic (and somewhat trivial), the other
stronger and problematic. Here is the
weaker one (I take P1 to be the paint-
ing by the counterrevolutionary Russian
émigré, “Red Square” and P2 to be the
painting called “The Israelites crossing the
Red Sea”):
(1∗) The observable properties of P1 are
the same as the observable properties
of P2.
(2∗) The aesthetically relevant proper-
ties of P1 are different from the
aesthetically relevant properties of
P2.
(3∗) Aesthetically relevant properties do
not supervene on observable proper-
ties.
I take it that no-one would want to
deny (1∗), (2∗) or (3∗). Nor should any
of these claims strike anyone as partic-
ularly surprising or novel. Everyone but
really strict formalists would accept that at
least some aesthetically relevant properties
do not supervene on observable proper-
ties. Danto must have meant something
stronger. In fact, he did mean something
stronger, namely, the following:
(1) The perceptual experience of P1 is the
same as the perceptual experience of
P2.
(2) The aesthetically relevant properties
we attribute to P1 are different from
the ones we attribute to P2.
(3) The attribution of aesthetically rele-
vant properties does not supervene on
our perceptual experience.
Note the difference between this argument
for (3) and the one for (3∗) above. (3∗) is
about the logical relation between aesthet-
ically relevant properties and observable
properties, whereas (3) is about the logical
relation between two kinds ofmental states
(the attribution of aesthetically relevant
properties and perceptual experiences).
Very different claims (and very different
arguments) indeed.
We have good reasons to hold (2). And
(3) clearly follows from (1) and (2). The
problem with Danto’s argument for (3) is
premise (1). I will argue that premise (1) is
false. But, again, (1∗) is true:
(1∗) The observable properties of P1 are
the same as the observable properties
of P2.
The observable properties of the two
paintings are, by supposition, exactly the
same. In fact, Danto goes further and says
that even all physical properties of the two
pictures are identical. But (1∗) does not
imply (1). Two objects may have the very
same observable properties, nonetheless,
one’s perceptual experience of them may
be very different. (1∗) only implies (1) if
we add a further premise, one that Danto
took for granted (see esp. Danto, 2001a,b;
see also Fodor, 1993):
(1∗∗) Perceptual experiences are not
cognitively penetrable.
Danto’s argument only goes through if we
add this extra premise (see also Wollheim,
1993; Margolis, 1998, 2000; Lamarque,
2010; Nanay, 2015). If we block (1∗∗), we
have no reason to hold (1) and then we
have no reason to hold (3). Here is the
reason why blocking (1∗∗) jeopardizes the
whole argument. If perceptual experiences
are cognitively penetrable (i.e., if (1∗∗) is
false), then the difference in the title of
the pictures can and will bring about a
perceptual difference. As a result of my
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non-perceptual state of reading the title,
my perceptual experience will be different.
But then (1) is false, which means that
there is no reason to hold (3).
And, as it turns out, there is very
strong empirical evidence against (1∗∗)—
both as a general claim and as a claim
in this specific context (Goldstone, 1995;
Hansen et al., 2006; Lupyan and Spivey,
2008; Lupyan et al., 2010; Lupyan and
Ward, 2013; Nanay, 2013a,b, but see also
Firestone and Scholl, 2014 for a critical
analysis). There are top-down processes
that influence perceptual processing as
early as the primary visual cortex (Gandhi
et al., 1999) or the thalamus (O’Connor
et al., 2002). Here is an old experiment,
very much known at the time when Danto
gave this argument (Delk and Fillenbaum,
1965): if we have to match the color of a
picture of an orange heart to color sam-
ples, we match it differently (closer to the
red end of the spectrum) from the way
we match the color of a picture of some
other, orange shapes. This shows that our
recognition of the object in question (the
heart) influences the color we experience
it as having. In general, one’s experience is
not determined in a bottom-upmanner by
the perceptual stimulus: it depends on lan-
guage, attention, the contrast classes and
one’s expectations (see Hansen et al., 2006;
Lupyan and Ward, 2013).
The defender of Danto’s claim would
need to deny that we have any reasons to
question (1∗∗). The concept of “cognitive
penetrability” has been severely debated
in the last decades and depending on
how one defines this concept (see Siegel,
2011; Macpherson, 2012 for summaries),
it may not be too farfetched to retain
some sense in which perceptual experi-
ences are not cognitively penetrable—in
which case, we can salvage (1∗∗) and
with it Danto’s argument. While it may
indeed be true that there may be some
sense in which perceptual experiences are
cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn, 1999),
the sense of cognitive impenetrability that
would be required for Danto’s argument to
go through is not one of these.
Here is why (Levin and Banaji, 2006):
Two pictures of identical (mixed race)
faces were shown to subjects—the only
difference between them was that under
one the subjects read the word “white”
and under the other they read “black.”
When they had to match the color of
the face, subjects chose a significantly
darker color for the face with the label
“black”1.
This experiment has the exact same
structure as Danto’s thought experiment:
the two visual stimuli share all their
observable properties—just like the two
canvases. But, crucially, our experience of
the two stimuli are different—we see one
as being darker than the other. Similarly,
when we see the painting called Red
Square, our perceptual experience of the
painting may be colored by our previ-
ous exposure of the soviet red flag, for
example—something that is missing from
our perceptual experience of the other
painting.While (1∗) is true, (1) is false. But
if (1) is false, then we have no reason to
hold (3).
The gallery of indiscernibles thought
experiment is based on an empirically
inadequate way of thinking about percep-
tion. On any empirically adequate ways of
thinking about perception, we have no rea-
son to take the gallery of indiscernibles
seriously.
The structure of my argument was
that we can bypass the thorny question
of what counts as cognitive penetration
because whatever sense it is in which
our perception of the faces in the Levin
and Banaji experiment is penetrable, it
is exactly the same sense in which our
perception of the artworks in Danto’s
thought experiment is penetrable. But it is
important to highlight that this is a very
weak sense of cognitive penetrability—
so much so that it wouldn’t even count
as cognitive penetrability under many
formulation of cognitive penetrability
(e.g., Siegel, 2011, p. 204) because all it
implies is that our perceptual experience
is subject to top-down attentional
1There has been some controversy about the Levin
and Banaji (2006) findings, especially about their first
experiment (e.g., Firestone and Scholl, 2014). But the
experiment I want to use here is not their first but their
second experiment (where two faces are identical in all
respects except for the label under them). While there
are somemethodological issues about this experiment
as well (about whether the label influences our expe-
rience or merely the matching task performed, see
Lupyan, in press, footnote 4), I want to bracket these
for the purposes of this discussion. If the reader is
not fully convinced by this experiment, she can use
some of the other, less debated empirical findings,
(see Goldstone, 1995; Hansen et al., 2006; Lupyan and
Spivey, 2008; Lupyan et al., 2010; Lupyan and Ward,
2013).
influences—something even those who
deny the cognitive penetrability of percep-
tion would accept (see Pylyshyn, 1999).
Taking the painting to be about Russia
or about the Red Sea influences what
properties of the picture we are attend-
ing to. But as the inattentional blind-
ness findings show, what properties we
are attending to very much influences our
perceptual phenomenology (and we also
know that attention can modulate even
the earliest stages of visual processing, the
primary visual cortex, see Gandhi et al.,
1999). But then our perceptual experi-
ence of the two paintings in the Gallery of
Indiscernibles thought experiment is very
different because we are attending to them
very differently.
Crucially, the difference in attention
brings about a difference in perceptual
phenomenology. To see this, it may be
helpful to consider the following example
(e.g., Nickel, 2007; Nanay, 2010): You are
looking at a 3 × 3 grid of squares against
a white background. First experience: you
are attending to the corner and the cen-
ter squares. Second experience: you are
attending to the remaining four squares.
The two experiences are phenomenally
different—different squares seem promi-
nent.
In other words, different ways of
attending to very simple figures of this
kind changes our perceptual phenomenol-
ogy. But then presumably different ways
of attending to Danto’s indistinguishable
canvases would also make our perceptual
phenomenology of these experiences dif-
ferent. It is important to emphasize that
this phenomenal difference is a difference
in perceptual phenomenology. There are
some more controversial cases, like the
duck-rabbit illusion, where it is also true
that attention to the rabbit vs. attention to
the duck very much influences our phe-
nomenology. But in the duck-rabbit case
one could object that what changes is
not something perceptual: that it is the
interpretation of the scene that changes
(Brewer, 2007, p. 93).
In the case of the 3 × 3 grid, however,
the phenomenal differences (e.g., salience)
are clearly properties that are perceptually
experienced (even by the thinnest accounts
of perceptual experience). And we can run
the same explanatory scheme for why our
perceptual experience of P1 is different
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from our perceptual experience of P2—in
one, but not in the other, our experience
of the red of the canvas is colored by the
association of the red of the Soviet flag,
for example. But then the difference in the
attribution of aesthetically relevant prop-
erties is accompanied by a difference in our
perceptual experience. Danto’s argument
from the Gallery of Indiscernibles fails.
We can now conclude that the attri-
bution of aesthetically relevant properties,
while it does not have to be a percep-
tual attribution, very much supervenes
on one’s perceptual experience: if there
is a difference in the attribution of aes-
thetically relevant properties, there must
also be a difference in one’s perceptual
experience. This restores the nice and
tight connection between aesthetically rel-
evant properties and perception: while
not all aesthetically relevant properties
are perceived, they all have very serious
perceptual consequences.
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